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1. Introduction 
Since at least as early as the 1950s, the press and academic researchers have remarked on 
the high levels of US CEO pay and questioned whether these levels are consistent with share 
value maximization [e.g., Murphy (1999)].  As these high levels have continued, there has been 
an increased willingness among academic researchers to suggest that US CEO pay practices 
reflect managerial rent-extraction.1 The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this issue by 
comparing CEO pay and incentives in the US with CEO pay and incentives in the UK, the latter 
being a country with a similar economy, but where excessive pay and managerial rent extraction 
are generally considered to be less problematic. Specifically, we examine whether, and to what 
extent, pay differences between US and UK CEOs can be explained by differences in incentives 
and in risk premiums paid to CEOs for bearing incentive risk.  Our results suggest that the 
commonly-held view that US CEO pay is high relative to UK CEO pay may not hold once one 
considers the risk premiums attributable to greater holdings of risky equity incentives.  
The suitability of corporate governance in general, and of executive compensation and 
incentives in particular, continues to be of much interest to both academics and practitioners.  
The spate of corporate scandals in the United States over the last decade, as well as accusations 
about corporate largesse in the face of the current financial crisis, have once again focused 
attention on the pay received by those at the very top of organizations. Moreover, a growing 
body of academic research proposes that problems with US governance and CEO pay are so 
profound that overpayment of CEOs is not limited to a few bad apples, but that all CEOs in the 
US economy are overpaid [e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck 
(2004)].  If this conjecture is correct, within-country benchmarking can provide an indication of 
                         
1 See Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, (2002), 
Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004). 
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how compensation practices vary with governance quality within the US, but tells us little about 
whether US executive compensation practices as a whole suffer from systemic poor governance 
and excessive pay.  Instead it is necessary to compare US practices with those of other countries 
where compensation practices ex ante are expected to suffer from these problems to a lesser 
extent [e.g., Core, Guay, and Thomas (2005) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003)]. 
In this paper, we use the United Kingdom as a benchmark against which to examine 
whether CEO pay in the United States appears unusually high.  These two economies share 
important governance features (such as active takeover markets, unitary board structures, etc.).  
However, the UK is generally considered to be less afflicted by problems of excessive executive 
compensation.  As we discuss below, and as is detailed in Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 
(2006), certain features of the UK governance environment may constrain pay. For example, 
unlike the US, UK shareholders vote on executive compensation packages. Further, in a 
comparison of pay between the two countries in 1997, Conyon and Murphy (2000) show that, 
after controlling for economic determinants of pay, CEO compensation in the UK is 
systematically lower than in the US.   
Using US and UK CEO pay and incentives data for 1997 and 2003, we show that US 
CEOs have greater pay, but also hold substantially greater equity incentives than their UK 
counterparts.  For example, after controlling for firm characteristics, the US CEOs’ 2003 pay 
was about 1.3 times the pay of UK CEOs.  However, US CEOs’ 2003 equity incentives were 
about 4.6 times greater than those of UK CEOs (the 1997 differences in pay and incentives were 
even greater).  
A central tenet of agency theory and contracting predicts that executives will require 
greater pay to bear greater incentive risk (e.g., Pratt, 1964). The key research question in our 
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paper is whether some or all of the difference in pay between US and UK CEOs can be explained 
by greater risk premiums paid to US CEOs as compensation for their holdings of greater equity 
incentives. To examine this hypothesis, we first note that total pay to a risk-averse CEO is the 
sum of a risk premium for bearing incentive risk plus “risk-adjusted pay,” which consists of 
compensation for CEO ability, compensation for CEO effort, and any rents the CEO obtains. For 
convenience we term these two components of pay “risk premium” and “risk-adjusted pay.”  To 
partition pay into these components, we extend the method used in Cai and Vijh (2005), and 
estimate risk premiums for US and UK CEOs using data on equity incentives and various 
assumptions about CEO risk-aversion and outside wealth.  We then subtract these risk premiums 
from total pay to estimate CEOs’ risk-adjusted pay.   
For a reasonable range of parameters, we find that after controlling for the risk premium, 
risk-adjusted pay for the US CEOs is not consistently higher than that for UK CEOs 
(specifically, we find risk-adjusted pay to be higher for US CEOs in 1997, but higher for UK 
CEOs in 2003). We conclude that critics of high US executive pay should give greater 
consideration to the incentives borne by US CEOs and the risk premiums that executives are 
likely to require to bear these incentives. We also note that while our risk premium estimates 
undoubtedly contain measurement error, the main takeaway from our analysis seems unlikely to 
be altered: that risk premiums in CEO pay must be considered to draw accurate inferences about 
the appropriateness of CEO pay levels. Further, we recognize that although risk premiums offer a 
potential economic explanation for why US pay is higher than UK pay, it leaves open the 
question of why US incentives are so much larger than UK incentives. We discuss differences in 
wealth accumulation as a potential reason for these differences, and suggest that researchers 
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should shift their efforts toward better understanding the reasons for differences in incentives 
between US CEOs and CEOs in other parts of the world.  
As a supplemental and exploratory analysis, we also examine pay and incentive 
differences between a sample of 40 non-UK European (EU) CEOs and a matched sample of US 
CEOs. Similar to the UK-US analysis, we find that EU CEOs receive less pay and hold less 
equity incentives that US CEOs. Using estimates of the risk premium to construct measures of 
risk-adjusted pay, we find that about half of the difference in US-EU CEO pay may be explained 
by differences in equity incentives. Although these findings provide an interesting perspective on 
US-EU CEO pay differences, we caveat these results by noting that there are likely to be greater 
differences in governance, institutional, and social structures between US and non-UK EU firms 
that between US and UK firms.  
In the next section, we motivate the paper, review related literature, and describe our 
sample and data.  In Section 3, we present univariate and multivariate comparisons of pay and 
incentives for the US and UK over time. In Section 4, we estimate risk premiums related to 
incentive holdings and examine whether US pay is high compared to UK pay once differences in 
incentives are controlled for. Section 5 provides exploratory analysis of differences in risk-
adjusted pay between non-UK European firms and US firms. In the final section, we offer 
concluding remarks and caveats to our conclusions. 
 
2. Executive compensation in the US and UK: Motivation and data 
2.1 Motivation and literature review 
Recent research has suggested that US pay is “too high” and that CEOs are able to exploit 
existing governance arrangements and extract rents [Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Bebchuk, 
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Fried, and Walker (2002)].  The claim that US CEO pay is “too high” begs the question – “too 
high compared to what?”  If the pay of every CEO within an economy is considered excessive, 
then there is no within-economy control group against which to evaluate the compensation 
package of any given CEO.  In this paper, we compare US CEO pay to UK CEO pay.  The US 
and UK have very similar economies, but as we describe below, the UK is generally considered 
to be less afflicted by problems of excessive executive compensation. As such, the UK can be 
usefully considered as a control group with which to compare US CEO compensation.   
The extant research investigating international differences in CEO pay arrangements is 
sparse.  Indeed, the majority of executive compensation papers are single country studies rather 
than research designed to probe cross-country differences in pay setting strategies.  An exception 
is Conyon and Murphy (2000), who find that after controlling for size, sector and other firm and 
executive characteristics, US CEOs earned 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total 
compensation in 1997 than UK CEOs.2   
What explains these pay differences? Conyon and Murphy (2000) argue that the 
differences could be largely attributed to greater stock option awards in the US arising from 
institutional and cultural acceptance of equity pay in the US vis-à-vis the UK. Consistent with 
this explanation, Abowd and Kaplan (1999) examine survey pay estimates from Towers Perrin 
from 1984 to 1996 and find that stock options, expressed as a fraction of CEO pay, were 
increasing in the US but not elsewhere.  Consistent with options contributing to an excessive pay 
problem, several researchers, such as Hall and Murphy (2002) and Jensen, Murphy and Wruck 
(2004), argue that US compensation committees historically have under-appreciated the full cost 
                         
2 Other research examining international differences in pay and governance includes Crystal, Main, and O’Reilly 
(1994) and Abowd and Kaplan (1999) for the US relative to the UK, Kaplan (1994a, b) for the US relative to Japan 
and Germany, and Conyon and Schwalbach (1999) for differences in European pay. 
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of options, and as a result, overpaid executives with option grants. Further supporting this 
conjecture, until recently, stock option disclosures were more detailed in the UK than in the US.   
A second, and related, explanation is that pay-related governance problems are more 
severe in the US. By this explanation, US firms overpay their executives using stock options 
because option pay is less visible to shareholders [e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004)]. Although the 
governance structures of the US and UK are similar in many respects (e.g., both economies have 
active takeover markets, single board internal control systems with remuneration committees, 
etc.), differences do exist. For example, the roles of the CEO and Chairman positions are more 
often separated in the UK.3 Further, UK shareholders vote regularly on executive compensation 
packages, although there is no evidence that say-on-pay proposals change the level or growth of 
CEO pay (e.g., Ferri and Maber, 2008). The outcome of this voting mechanism is frequently 
negative, and although the vote is not binding, companies often adhere to them.  Also, until very 
recently UK firms, but not US firms, were required to disclose whether a compensation 
consultant was hired by management to design their pay packages and the name of the consulting 
firm. As a final point, if the UK has lower tolerance of income inequality, this would constitute 
another cultural norm or governance mechanism that constrains executive pay. 
A third possibility, which we explore in this paper, is that there is no difference in the 
efficiency of pay outcomes in the two countries. Instead, differences in pay between the US and 
UK may be explained by differences in risk premiums for bearing incentive risk. If the optimal 
contract requires a CEO to hold more incentives, the CEO will demand more pay. Prior research 
provides some initial support for this conjecture. Conyon and Murphy (2000) find that in 1997 
US CEOs held greater equity incentives than did UK CEOs.  Conyon and Murphy briefly 
                         
3 See, for example, “No excessive pay, we’re British,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2006, page C1.  
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consider, but dismiss, the equilibrium explanation that US executives have larger incentives and 
therefore larger pay. 
 
2.2 Data description 
Our primary goal in this paper is to explore the role of incentive risk in a comparison of 
US and UK CEO compensation. While the US data are readily available in machine-readable 
form, the UK data require hand collection.4 Because of the costs of hand collection, we limit 
ourselves to examining the year of the latest available data at the time we began this study, 2003, 
and the year of the earliest available UK data, 1997 (the basic points of the paper, however, are 
not expected to be sensitive to particular years chosen for analysis).5  Our UK data are hand-
collected from annual reports and accounts of UK firms (broadly equivalent to US DEF 14A 
proxy statements).  These companies are drawn from the largest 250 UK publicly traded firms 
ranked by market capitalization in each of the years. We report results based on 177 UK CEOs in 
1997 and 214 UK CEOs in 2003 for which we have complete data. As supplemental analysis, in 
Section 5, we also explore the role of incentive risk in a comparison of US CEO pay with CEO 
pay of firms in other non-UK European countries. 
Our US data come from the comprehensive Compustat ExecuComp database, which 
includes firms in the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, the S&P SmallCap 600, and the S&P 
supplemental indices.  Our US sample consists of 1,372 CEOs in 1997 and 1,511 CEOs in 2003.  
                         
4 Unfortunately, it is both labor- and time-intensive to collect UK executive compensation data.  Although 
compensation disclosure in the UK was significantly expanded following the Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) 
reports, the disclosed data is usually not available electronically and must be hand-collected.  Moreover, the 
information is not reported in the same tabular form across different companies, making data collection more 
difficult. Currently, UK companies disclose information comparable to those available for US executives including 
exercise prices, maturity terms, options granted and information on stock options outstanding. 
 
5 1997 is the first year that UK companies were required to disclose data on stock option grants to top executives. 
For a similar reason, prior studies of US pay often begin at 1992 because this is the first year that US companies 
were required to disclose data on stock option grants to top executives. 
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However, as shown in Panels A and B of Table 1, because we examine the largest 250 UK firms, 
the median US firm tends to be smaller than the median UK firm. The median UK firm has sales 
of $1.6 billion ($1.8 billion) in 2003 (1997), as compared to median sales for the US firms of 
$1.1 billion ($1.0 billion) in 2003 (1997). Similar size differences are observed between the UK 
and US firms based on market capitalization. To mitigate the concern that our findings are 
influenced by size differences across the US-UK firms, in most of our tests, we focus on a 
subsample of US firms that are matched (within industry) to the UK firms using a propensity-
score procedure (discussed in more detail below).6   
 
2.3 Measurement of CEO pay and incentives 
Executive compensation in the UK and the US consists of the same basic elements. CEOs 
in both countries receive base salaries and are eligible to receive annual bonuses, usually based 
on accounting performance. CEOs in both countries frequently receive stock options, and can 
also receive restricted stock. In the US, restricted stock grants typically vest with the passage of 
time but not with performance criteria. In the UK, by contrast, the vesting of restricted stock is 
typically tied to the attainment of performance objectives. In our empirical work, we define total 
pay for the firm’s CEO as the sum of salary, bonus, benefits, stock options, restricted stock 
grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards) and other compensation.7  We 
estimate the grant date value of options granted during the year using a modified version of the 
Black-Scholes (1973) model. Consistent with the findings of Hemmer, Matsunaga and Shevlin 
(1996) and Huddart and Lang (1996) that employees exercise options prior to maturity, we 
                         
6 All of our inference holds when we conduct our tests using the full US sample. 
7 In the case of the United States, we use variable item TDC1 from the ExecuComp database. For the UK we 
calculate total pay from information contained in the annual reports. 
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assume the expected time-to-exercise is 70% of the option grant's stated maturity. Our inference, 
however, is unaffected if we value the option grant using the stated time-to-maturity. 
Panel C of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for CEO total pay for our full sample of 
US and UK firms.  We provide figures for the average and median values, as well as the 
percentage change in these values from 1997 to 2003.  The total pay data illustrate that the broad 
sample of US CEOs earn more than the sample of British CEOs.  In 1997, the median US CEO’s 
pay was $2.0 million, or 100% more than the median UK CEO’s pay of $1.0 million. In 2003, 
the median US CEO’s pay was $2.5 million, or 30% more than the median UK CEO’s pay of 
$1.9 million. Note that the higher pay for US CEOs is observed in spite of the fact that the US 
firms in the full sample are somewhat smaller than the UK firms (we control for this size 
difference explicitly below). As a final point on Panel C, the pay differential between the US and 
UK CEOs appears to have narrowed between 1997 and 2003.8 There is a 92% increase in median 
UK CEO pay from 1997 to 2003, as compared to a 29% increase in median US CEO pay over 
this time period.9    
We turn now to our measure of CEO equity incentives, which recognizes that incentives 
are greater when the CEO has more of his wealth invested in firm equity and less in other assets. 
The sensitivity of annual pay to stock returns captures only a small part of CEO equity 
incentives.  Much greater incentives are provided by the sensitivity of the CEO’s holding of 
                         
8 Although the determinants of changes in pay and incentives for UK CEOs over time is an interesting research 
question, the objective of our study is to explore the implications of equity incentive risk premiums for cross-
sectional differences in US vs. UK (and EU) CEO pay. That is, we seek to understand whether US and UK pay 
appears to be different once pay is adjusted for the risk premium stemming from equity incentives.    
9 As a caveat to interpreting the changes in pay over time, we note that changes in business conditions over the six-
year window from 1997 to 2003 have not been identical in the US and UK.  For example, in Panel B of Table 1, we 
show that the median US firm’s market value fell by 2% from 1997 to 2003 compared to a decline of 27% for the 
UK sample firms. This relatively greater decline in market values for UK firms makes the relatively greater increase 
in UK pay even more surprising. Aggregate price inflation from 1997 to 2003 was 8.1% in the UK (1.3% per year) 
as compared to 15.2% in the US (2.4% per year), but these changes in general price levels seem unlikely to explain 
the observed pay changes.  We also note that average exchange rates were very similar in 1997 and 2003: in both 
years, one UK pound sterling was worth about 1.64 US dollars. 
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stock and options to changes in shareholder value.  Stock and options directly link CEO wealth 
to shareholder value, and are the major component of total CEO equity incentives [Hall and 
Liebman (1998) and Jensen and Murphy (1990)].   
We measure equity incentives as equivalent stock value. For example, we refer to $100 of 
stock as having $100 of incentives. However, because options are equivalent to a leveraged 
investment in stock, $100 of options has a greater sensitivity to stock returns, and greater 
incentives, than $100 of stock. To estimate the sensitivity of option value to stock price, i.e., the 
option portfolio delta, we use the method developed by Core and Guay (2002), with option 
maturities set to 70% of the Core and Guay assumed times-to-maturity to adjust for expected 
early exercise. We compute the total incentive measure as:  (share price) × (the number of shares 
held) + (share price) × (option delta) × (the number of options held).10 We note that our incentive 
measure is a scaled version (i.e., multiplied by 100) of a commonly-used incentive measure: 
dollar change in the CEO's wealth from a 1% stock price increase [Baker and Hall (2004) and 
Core and Guay (1999)]. We use the scaled equivalent stock value incentive measure to facilitate 
our later discussions of the risk premium required for holding incentives.  
In Panel D of Table 1, we provide descriptive evidence that US CEO equity incentives 
are greater than those of UK CEOs. The median US CEO in 2003 had incentives equal to about 
$19.6 million in stock equivalent value.  That is, for each 1% increase in the stock price, the 
median CEO would experience a $196,000 increase in his equity value (=1% x $19.6 million).  
This compares to the median UK CEO incentives of about $3.8 million in stock equivalent value. 
The incentive data are positively skewed with mean values substantially greater than median 
values. This skewness is largely due to a small percentage of both US and UK CEOs who hold 
very large amounts of equity. Between 1997 and 2003, the median UK CEO incentives increased 
                         
10 Shares held includes restricted stock and performance-vested restricted stock. 
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by about 58% compared to 24% for US CEOs’ incentives.  Overall, the evidence in the bottom 
two panels of Table 1 shows that American CEOs have greater wealth and incentives in their 
firms compared with their British counterparts, but that UK CEOs’ incentives have exhibited a 
greater relative increase from 1997 and 2003. 
 
3. Analysis of relative US and UK CEO pay and incentives 
We begin our analysis by showing that the US-UK pay difference, which has previously 
been documented in the literature, holds within our data. Although the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 suggest such a premium, a proper test should control for differences in firm 
characteristics known to vary with CEO pay.   
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report coefficient estimates of the US-UK pay difference, 
using OLS regression methods and controlling for company size, growth opportunities, firm 
performance, stock idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and industry factors. Extant research on 
executive compensation has consistently hypothesized and found that larger firms with greater 
growth opportunities require more talented and more highly paid managers [e.g., Smith and 
Watts (1992)].  In addition, researchers often include controls for company performance, tenure, 
and firm risk (as proxies for ability or demand for ability). The models therefore include as 
controls the market value of the firm dated at t-1, the book-to-market assets ratio dated at t-1, the 
performance of the firm (measured as the one-year total return to shareholders), the idiosyncratic 
risk of shareholder returns (as a proxy for risk), CEO tenure, and a set of industry dummy 
variables. We also include a proxy for leverage, measured as the ratio of book value of liabilities 
to market value of assets.  Prior research finds that annual pay is greater for CEOs that also serve 
as Chairman of the Board, and UK CEOs are typically less likely than US CEOs to serve both of 
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these roles (see also Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, which indicate that UK CEOs are less likely to 
serve as the Chairman in our sample). We therefore include a CEO-Chair Indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the CEO is also board chair, and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable 
in columns (1) and (2) is log(Total Pay).  Regressions including both US and UK CEOs are 
performed separately for 1997 and 2003 in columns (1) and (2).   
Consistent with prior research, Table 2 indicates that CEO pay increases with firm size, 
growth opportunities, risk, and performance. However, the main coefficient of interest in 
columns (1) and (2) is the variable “US indicator” which is equal to one if the firm is US and 
zero if UK.  The coefficient estimate on the US indicator variable for 2003 in column (2) is a 
significantly positive 0.25, indicating that after controlling for various firm, CEO, and industry 
factors, CEOs in the US earn approximately 28% more total compensation than their British 
counterparts in that year.  An interesting feature of Table 2 is that it shows a narrowing of pay 
differences from 1997 to 2003.  US CEO total pay was about 92% higher than UK CEO pay in 
1997, but this difference narrowed to 28% in 2003.11  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 report coefficient estimates of the difference between US 
and UK incentives using a series of OLS regressions similar to those for total pay in columns (1) 
and (2), and controlling for company size, growth opportunities, idiosyncratic risk, CEO tenure, 
a CEO-Chair indicator, and industry factors.  The dependent variable in all columns is log(equity 
                         
11 We note that relatively little of these differences in pay is likely to be explained by differences in personal taxes or 
cost of living across the two countries. The top marginal tax rates are similar for the US and UK, and stock option 
grants and exercises are taxed similarly. Executives in the US are typically taxed at the highest marginal tax rate, 
which is currently about 39%, but the full US tax rate is somewhat higher, due to state and local taxes ranging from 
0% to about 10%, depending on the jurisdiction.  In the UK, the highest marginal tax rate is 40% (although this top 
rate is applicable at lower income levels in the UK). Further, the cost of living in major metropolitan areas is 
roughly similar across the two countries. Mercer Human Resource Consulting (2005) conducts a Cost of Living 
Survey which covers 144 cities across six continents and measures the comparative cost of over 200 items in each 
location, including housing, transport, food, clothing, household goods and entertainment.  London is the most 
expensive city in Europe and is ranked third globally, while New York is the most expensive city in the US and is 
ranked thirteenth globally. Outside of major metropolitan areas, the cost of living in the UK is generally lower than 
that of comparable US cities. 
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incentives). As in Table 2, regressions including both US and UK CEOs are performed 
separately for 1997 and 2003. The coefficients on the control variables in the incentives 
regressions are consistent with prior literature: Larger firms with greater growth opportunities 
use more incentives, and CEOs with longer tenure and who also serve as board chair hold more 
equity incentives. Consistent with prior mixed results on the association between risk and 
incentives, idiosyncratic risk shows a positive association with incentives in column (3), and a 
negative association in column (4). 
In the 2003 regression, the coefficient estimate on the US indicator is 1.72 and indicates 
that, after controlling for firm, CEO, and industry factors, CEOs in the US hold about 464% 
more equity incentives than their UK counterparts in that year. This suggests that CEOs in the 
US have much more wealth tied up in firm equity that is at risk to adverse price shocks.12 As 
with the pay difference, the US-UK incentive difference in 2003 has declined somewhat from 
1997 (464% vs. 582%, respectively). 
The regressions in columns (1)-(4) indicate, not surprisingly, that CEO pay and 
incentives are influenced by many firm characteristics, such as size and growth. Further, the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that the US and UK samples differ across some of these 
dimensions. Therefore, to facilitate clear comparisons across the two samples, we use a 
propensity-score-matching procedure to select a firm from the US sample (which contains a 
much larger number of observations) for each UK firm. The propensity scores are computed 
based on the by-year logit regressions presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2, which include 
all the control variables from columns (1)-(4). The dependent variable is a “UK indicator” which 
is equal to one if the firm is UK and zero if US. The significant positive coefficients on tenure in 
                         
12 We note that differences in incentives borne through risk of CEO turnover are unlikely to account for these 
differences in incentives. Average UK CEO turnover is similar to, if not somewhat less frequent than, that of the US 
[e.g., Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002)]. 
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both years suggest that UK CEOs serve longer, and the negative coefficient on board chair 
suggests that fewer UK CEOs are also board chairs. Finally, UK firms tend to be less risky and 
to have lower shareholder returns. We match each UK firm to the US firm with the closest 
propensity score within two-digit SIC code (the propensity-score regressions only include US 
observations for which there is a UK observation in the same industry). 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the propensity-score-matched US sample. As 
expected and by construction, there are much smaller differences in firm size (sales and market 
value) between the two samples. Most importantly for our purposes, however, the direction and 
magnitude of differences in total pay and incentives are quite similar to the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 1. For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the propensity-score-matched 
US sample in our analyses. 
 
4. Results - The relation between pay and incentives 
To this point, we have illustrated that the level of CEO compensation is higher for 
American CEOs compared to British CEOs.  Further, we show that US CEOs have more wealth 
at risk in their companies’ stock and stock options relative to UK CEOs. There are economic 
benefits and costs to imposing incentives. The benefits of incentives are that they align the 
CEO’s interests with those of shareholders and encourage the CEO to make decisions that 
increase shareholder value. However, the cost of these incentives is that a CEO will not work 
unless he is adequately compensated, and a risk-averse CEO will demand more compensation as 
the amount of incentives imposed is increased.  All agency models predict that the greater the 
amount of incentives imposed on an agent, the more he will be paid. Recent research emphasizes 
that risk-averse and undiversified CEOs discount the value of their firm-specific equity [e.g., 
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Hall and Murphy (2002)]. This occurs because CEOs would prefer to invest their wealth in a 
more diversified portfolio, and therefore do not value $1 in firm stock as much as $1 invested in 
this more diversified portfolio. The more incentives the CEO holds, the less his wealth is 
diversified, and the greater the risk premium he requires.   
The idea that pay will be higher when incentives are higher can also shed light on the 
differences between CEO pay in the US and the UK. Table 4 provides a descriptive example. 
Columns (1) and (2) show median CEO total pay and beginning-of-year CEO portfolio 
incentives for 1997 and 2003, respectively. Recall that this incentive measure is defined as the 
change in the value of CEO equity holdings for a percentage change in the stock price, and 
equates $100 in stock to $100 in incentives. Column (3) shows that in 1997 (2003) the median 
US CEO received $1,163,000 ($442,000) more pay and held $12,783,000 ($14,587,000) more 
incentives. In the final row of each panel, we compute the ratio of incremental pay received by 
the median US CEO for incremental incentives held. This incremental pay is 9.10% per unit of 
incentives in 1997, and 3.03% per unit of incentives in 2003. In other words, our matched sample 
of US CEOs receive between $3.03 and $9.10 in extra annual pay for holding an undiversified 
position equivalent to $100 in firm stock. In the next section, we explore whether the magnitude 
of this premium appears reasonable given various assumptions about CEO risk aversion, wealth, 
firm characteristics.   
 
4.1 Estimating the risk premium for holding incentives 
That CEOs who hold greater incentives should receive greater pay seems reasonable. The 
key question is what magnitude of extra pay would we expect the US CEOs to receive given the 
extra incentives they hold? In other words, is a range of $3.03 to $9.10 in extra pay per $100 of 
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extra incentives reasonable? Some light can be shed by extending the work of Hall and Murphy 
(2002) and Cai and Vijh (2005) on the risk premium a CEO will require for accepting equity pay 
in lieu of cash pay. Hall and Murphy and Cai and Vijh show that the magnitude of the risk 
premium increases with the proportion of the manager's wealth that is invested in firm equity (as 
opposed to diversified assets) and with the CEO’s risk-aversion.  Both outside wealth (money 
not held in firm equity) and risk-aversion are unobservable to the researcher.  However, prior 
literature typically assumes that outside wealth ranges between 50% and 100% of the CEO's 
inside wealth. For example, if the CEO owns $10 million in firm equity, the literature assumes 
that his outside diversified holdings range from $5 million to $10 million.  In addition, the 
literature typically assumes that the CEO's relative risk-aversion ranges from two to three [see 
for example, Hall and Murphy (2002) and Cai and Vijh (2005)]. 
Part of pay can be thought of as compensation for the CEO holding firm equity instead of 
selling the equity and diversifying (holding aside the component of pay related to the CEO’s skill 
and cost of effort, and any rents that he may extract, which we refer to as “risk-adjusted pay”).  
In other words, one can think of a portion of annual pay as the risk premium paid to the CEO for 
holding an undiversified position in firm equity for the next year. Another way to think of this 
risk premium is:  How much less pay would the CEO accept if he were released from the 
restriction that he hold a substantial fraction of his wealth in firm stock? To estimate this risk 
premium, we extend and modify the methods of Hall and Murphy (2002) and Cai and Vijh 
(2005). We solve for the risk premium the CEO requires to be indifferent between (1) receiving 
the risk premium and holding the firm equity position for one year, and (2) not receiving the risk 
premium, selling his firm equity, and holding a diversified portfolio instead. 
We derive the risk premium by numerically solving the following equation: 
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Wealth constrained to firm equity (inside wealth) is the CEO's beginning-of-year portfolio of 
stock and options. We assume: (1) the CEO's outside wealth is either 50% or 100% of the CEO's 
inside wealth, (2) the CEO has a power utility with relative risk-aversion of either 2 or 3, and (3) 
the CEO may invest his outside wealth in long positions in both the market portfolio and the 
risk-free asset (but may not sell short).13 The expression on the left side is the utility the CEO 
would receive if he could invest his total wealth in a utility-maximizing combination of the risk-
free asset and the market portfolio. We assume that this unconstrained wealth is equal to the 
market value of the CEO's stock and options, plus his outside wealth.14 The expression on the 
right side is the utility the CEO receives when he is constrained to hold the assumed fraction of 
his wealth in firm stock and options for one year, but may sell the securities at market value at 
the end of the year. We assume that the CEO invests the remainder of his wealth in a utility-
maximizing combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio, and that he holds these 
positions for one year. We assume a one-year holding period to match the period over which 
annual compensation is paid.15 The risk premium is the dollar amount that sets the two sides 
equal, and is assumed to be paid by the firm to the CEO at the end of the year.  
                         
13 Our assumption that the CEO chooses between the market portfolio and the risk-free asset is consistent with the 
literature, but is an abstraction of people’s real-world portfolio choices that may include large investments in other 
assets such as homes and other real estate. To the extent that portfolio choice varies by country, it may indicate 
differences in risk-aversion or in proportions of outside wealth across the countries. We discuss in sensitivity 
analysis in Section 4.3 below how our inference would vary if UK CEOs differed from US CEOs in risk-aversion or 
in proportions of outside wealth. 
14 To the extent that the CEO owns options or restricted stock, he will not be able to invest the market value of firm 
equity in a diversified portfolio. However, the objective of our method is to make comparisons of CEOs with 
different types of firm equity by asking the question:  How much less pay would the CEO accept if he were released 
from the explicit or implicit restriction that he hold a portion of his wealth in firm stock? 
 
15 Clearly some forms of compensation are restricted for multiple years, and options (if the executive wishes to 
obtain their full value) are implicitly restricted for the entire maturity. On the other hand, CEOs typically also own 
unrestricted stock and fully vested options. However, as noted above, the objective of our method is to make 
comparisons of CEOs with different types of firm equity by asking the question:  How much less pay would the 
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As an illustration of this method, in Table 5, we show the estimated risk premium for 
holding incentives for a hypothetical CEO. For convenience, we express this risk premium as a 
percentage of the CEO’s incentives.16 Consistent with intuition, the table shows that the CEO 
requires a greater risk premium when he is more risk-averse and when more of his wealth is 
concentrated in firm stock. For our hypothetical CEO, when relative risk-aversion is two (three) 
and 50% of his wealth is in firm stock, he requires a risk premium of 5.8% (8.5%). If the CEO is 
less diversified and holds 67% of his wealth in firm stock, he requires a risk premium of 7.6% 
(11.0%) for a risk-aversion parameter of two (three).  An estimated risk premium of 7.6% means 
that if the CEO has incentives of $1,000,000, he will require an annual risk premium of $76,000 
to compensate him for his lack of diversification. Another way to consider the risk premium is to 
suppose that a completely diversified shareholder requires a return of 10.0% on the firm’s stock.  
Then the CEO, because he is undiversified, requires a return of 17.6%, 7.6% in extra annual pay 
on top of the 10% expected return. The estimated risk premiums in Table 5 appear comparable to 
the incremental US pay per unit of incentives shown in Table 4.  In 2003, the median US CEO 
received $442,000 more pay for holding about $14.6 million more incentives, or an incremental-
pay-to-incremental-incentive ratio of 3.03% (in 1997, the incremental-pay-to-incremental 
incentive ratio was 9.10%). This 3.03% to 9.10% range of incremental-pay-to-incremental 
incentive ratios is slightly lower than, but roughly consistent with, the range of 5.8% to 11.0% 
shown in Table 5.  
                                                                               
CEO accept if he were released from the explicit or implicit restriction that he hold a portion of his wealth in firm 
stock? 
 
16 Under our assumption that the CEO has constant relative risk-aversion, the risk premium will be proportional to 
the magnitude of the incentives.  For example, if the CEO’s inside and outside wealth both increase by a factor of 
10, the risk premium will also increase by a factor of 10.  This makes it convenient to scale the computed risk 
premium, and in the table, we express the risk premium as a percentage of incentives. 
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It is important to note that we estimate a different risk premium than do Hall and Murphy 
(2002) and Cai and Vijh (2005), although we use similar numerical methods to Cai and Vijh. 
This prior work focuses on determining the executive's value of a new option grant by solving 
the following equation:  
)]  ' ,   ,   ([                
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The difference between the market value of the option (left-hand-side) and the executive’s value 
(right-hand-side) is the risk premium associated with the option. Because of its interest in 
determining the executive’s value for a new option grant, this work holds constant the risk 
premium for holding the existing portfolio, and solves for the incremental risk premium for a 
new option grant. In contrast, we solve for the risk premium associated with holding the entire 
existing equity portfolio.  
 
4.2 Estimating risk-adjusted pay 
As described above, we conceive of total pay as compensation for ability and effort, plus 
a risk premium. Given an executive’s incentives, one can estimate the risk premium and subtract 
it from total pay to obtain an estimate of “risk-adjusted pay”. For example, if one were to assume 
that CEOs in both the US and UK have relative risk-aversion of two and have 50% of their 
wealth in firm stock, our analysis suggests that the CEOs would receive a risk premium of 5.8% 
for bearing their incentive risk.  In Table 6, we use the median data shown in Table 4 to obtain an 
estimate of the median risk-adjusted pay received by these CEOs.  We compute the median risk-
adjusted pay by subtracting 5.8 times the CEO's beginning-of-year incentives from his total pay 
(5.8% is approximately the midpoint of the observed incremental pay per unit of incentives 
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reported in Table 4 for 1997 and 2003, and is the smallest of the estimated risk premium 
percentages presented in Table 5).  
The analysis in Table 6 suggests that controlling for the risk premium substantially 
reduces the pay differences between US CEOs and UK CEOs.  In 1997, the median matched US 
CEO received 118% more pay than the median UK CEO and held about 531% more equity 
incentives. After deducting the risk premium compensation for holding the median level of 
incentives, the median risk-adjusted pay in 1997 is 50% greater for US CEOs than UK CEOS 
($1,267,000 vs. $845,000). In 2003, we observe an even more striking result. The median 
matched US CEO received 23% more pay in 2003 than the median UK CEO and held 383% 
more equity incentives. After deducting the US and UK CEOs’ expected compensation for 
holding incentives, the median risk-adjusted pay in 2003 is 32% greater in the UK ($1,266,000 
for the median US CEO vs. $1,670,000 for the median UK CEO).17 
In Table 7, we examine whether these median results hold when the risk premium 
adjustment is applied on a CEO by CEO basis (as opposed to simply illustrating results using the 
median CEO). To compute a risk premium for each CEO, we use Equation (1) above with an 
assumption that CEOs have relative risk-aversion of 2 and 50% of their wealth outside the firm. 
Inputs into the calculation are each CEO’s beginning-of-year stock and option portfolio, the 
firm’s beta and volatility, an assumed market volatility of 20%, a risk-free rate of 5%, and a 
market risk premium of 6%.  We then compute each CEO’s risk-adjusted pay by subtracting the 
computed risk premium from his total pay. In Panel A, we present the computed risk premiums 
                         
17 The UK, to a much greater extent than the US, makes the vesting of options (and restricted stock) contingent upon 
the achievement of performance targets (e.g., Main, 2005). To the extent that these targets are non-trivial, 
performance-based vesting will lower the value of an option or restricted share and decrease the incentives provided 
by the equity (e.g., Johnson and Tian, 2000).  We do not have data to feasibly incorporate these effects into our 
analysis. As a result, our calculated numbers may somewhat overstate UK pay, and also overstate UK incentives and 
the risk premium associated with these incentives.  However, because the overstatement of pay will tend to be offset 
by the overstatement of the risk premium, it is not clear whether our measure of risk-adjusted pay for UK CEOs is 
somewhat overstated or understated.  
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as a percentage of incentives, which range from 3.68% to 7.21% at the median, depending on the 
year and country. The greater risk premiums in 2003 are the result of higher estimates of stock 
return volatility for the US and UK firms in that year. Because our propensity-score-matching 
procedure matches on idiosyncratic risk, the beta and stock volatility of the matched firms tend 
to be similar, and as a consequence there is no difference in risk premiums between the US and 
UK firms.    
Panel B of Table 7 shows that the average risk-adjusted pay is $1,406,000 for the 
matched US CEOs in 1997 and -$11,561,000 for 2003, as compared to $1,008,000 for the UK 
CEOs in 1997 and $936,000 in 2003. The large negative average value for US CEOs in 2003 is 
due to a small number of US CEOs that hold very large amounts of equity. Setting negative 
values of risk-adjusted pay to zero (see Column (2)), the adjusted averages show mean US risk-
adjusted pay that is larger than risk-adjusted pay in the UK ($2,595,000 vs. $1,087,000 in 1997 
and $2,651,000 vs. $2,086,000 in 2003). 
However, because the averages in both samples are influenced by some extreme 
observations, as above, we interpret the median values as being more representative of the 
samples. The median risk-adjusted pay for the US CEOs is about 63% greater than for the UK 
CEOs in 1997, $1,316,000 vs. $808,000, respectively. The median paired difference is 
significantly greater than 0. From 1997 to 2003, risk-adjusted pay for the UK CEOs increased, 
largely due to growth in CEO pay over that period. At the same time, US CEO risk-adjusted pay 
declined from 1997 to 2003, largely due to an increase in the estimated risk premium per unit of 
incentives (see Panel A of Table 7). As a result, the 2003 ordering of risk-adjusted pay is 
reversed, with the median UK CEO receiving more risk-adjusted pay than the median US CEO, 
$1,564,000 vs. $885,000, respectively. Now, the median paired difference is significantly less 
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than 0. Abstracting away from the magnitude, in 1997, 58.2% of US CEOs had greater risk-
adjusted pay, but this figure drops to 39.3% in 2003. Overall, the results in Table 7 (and in Table 
6) suggest that the commonly-held view that US CEO pay is high relative to UK CEO pay may 
not hold once one considers the risk premium attributable to greater holdings of risky equity 
incentives.   
 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis and Interpretation 
We interpret our findings as being consistent with US and UK CEOs receiving similar 
risk-adjusted pay, or at least that neither country’s CEOs appear to receive consistently higher 
risk-adjusted pay. However, given perceptions by many that US CEOs are overpaid relative to 
UK CEOs, we now consider a set of necessary conditions for our results to alternatively be 
interpreted as US CEOs receiving greater risk-adjusted pay relative to UK CEOs. Not 
surprisingly, such a conclusion requires that either our analysis excludes an important 
determinant of differences in US-UK pay levels, or that our risk premium estimates or the 
assumptions we use to develop them are incorrect.  
As sensitivity analyses, we first consider the possibility that differences in pay and/or 
incentives between UK and US CEOs might arise because of US-UK differences in global 
competitiveness or exchange listing. A more global UK firm is expected to participate in a more 
global CEO labor market, have a more global shareholder base, and may be more likely pay its 
CEO (and provide incentives) at levels comparable to those of CEOs in other countries, such as 
the US. As a proxy for the degree of exposure the UK firm has to global markets and 
shareholders (and in particular, US shareholders), we construct an indicator variable for whether 
the UK firm is listed on a US exchange. We also consider that the degree of product market 
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competition could potentially influence observed differences in pay between US-UK CEOs. If 
the higher observed compensation for US CEOs reflects excessive pay, we expect the ability of 
US firms to excessively pay their CEOs would be reduced in very competitive industries 
(likewise, CEO incentives in competitive industries should converge). A similar result (i.e., the 
convergence of pay) is expected if the lower pay in the UK is the result of social norms. As an 
inverse measure of the degree of market competition, we use the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of 
industry product market concentration, calculated using Compustat Global as the sum of squared 
market shares. Market shares are based on firm sales as a fraction of worldwide industry sales, 
where industry is based on 2-digit SIC codes. This measure is often used as a proxy of market 
power in the industrial organization literature since higher values are associated with oligopoly, 
and in the limit monopoly, power.  
In Table 8, we present regression models of the difference in UK-US CEO pay, 
incentives, and risk adjusted pay. The dependent variable is the difference between each matched 
pair (from the propensity-score match). The regressions include the Foreign Listing indicator and 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index as explanatory variables. The Foreign Listing variable indicates 
that the pay difference between US and UK CEOs (Column 1) is smaller when UK firms have 
US exchange listings. Interestingly, the differences in US-UK incentive levels (Column 2) 
appear to be somewhat greater when UK firms have US exchange listings. This could occur if 
the US listing improves monitoring, which lowers the need for incentives for the UK firm. 
Product market competition, as measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl index does not appear to 
have explanatory power for differences US-UK pay or incentives. Column (3) shows that the 
inclusion of the exchange listing and competition do not change our earlier finding that US risk-
adjusted pay is higher in 1997 and lower in 2003.  
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We turn now to consider how differences in the assumptions would change our 
assessment of US-UK CEO pay differences. We make the implicit assumption that the cost of 
CEO effort, and the compensation for CEO effort is the same for each pair of CEOs. Edmans, 
Gabaix, and Landier (2009) use an alternative assumption that is common in macroeconomic 
models: the cost of effort is proportional to wealth. Intuitively, the wealthier persons have greater 
opportunity costs. If this assumption is correct, since US CEOs tend to be wealthier, the 
differences in risk-adjusted pay shown in Table 7 overstate true pay differences: higher pay for 
US CEOs in 1997 is less positive, and higher pay for US CEOs in 2003 is more negative. 
Now suppose that CEOs in both countries had much lower risk-aversion than is assumed 
in the literature. In this case, the risk premium shown in Panel A of Table 7 would drop 
substantially for both countries, and US pay would again appear high compared to UK pay. In 
the extreme, if CEOs were risk neutral and required no risk premium for holding incentives, the 
comparison of risk-adjusted pay across the two countries would become identical to the 
comparison shown in Table 3 in which US CEOs receive 118% (23%) more pay than their UK 
counterparts in 1997 (2003).  
On the other hand, assuming that the literature’s assumptions of relative risk-aversion 
between two and three are correct, a claim that US CEOs are overpaid relative to UK CEOs 
would require some combination of the following: (1) UK CEOs hold a greater proportion of 
their total wealth in firm incentives, (2) UK CEOs are more risk-averse, or (3) the market for 
skill/ability in the UK is substantially more competitive than in the US.   
Although we are unable to provide additional evidence either for or against point (3) 
above, we are able to provide sensitivity tests for points (1) and (2).  To explore how our results 
would change under the assumptions that UK CEOs are more risk-averse and hold more of their 
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wealth in firm incentives, Table 9 revises the analysis in Table 6 to show the effect of assuming 
that the median UK CEO is more risk-averse (relative risk-aversion of three) than the median US 
CEO (relative risk-aversion of two), and has more incentives as a percentage of his wealth (67%) 
than the median US CEO (50%). The UK CEO would thus a require a risk premium of 11.0%  of 
incentives held, as compared to the US CEO, who would require a risk premium of 5.8% for of 
incentives held.  This analysis shows that the median US CEO received 76% more risk-adjusted 
pay than his median UK counterpart in 1997. However, by 2003 this difference had again 
reversed, with UK CEO risk-adjusted pay being about 16% greater than US risk-adjusted pay. 
In reality, it seems unlikely that UK CEOs hold a greater fraction of their wealth in the 
firm than US CEOs. If this were true, it would suggest implausibly large wealth differences 
between the two countries' CEOs. As shown in Table 9, because the median US CEO in 1997 
held 6.3 times the incentives of the median UK CEO, an assumption that the US CEO held 50% 
of his wealth in the firm compared to 67% for the UK CEO, would imply that the US CEO had 
8.5 times the wealth of the median UK CEO (assuming for simplicity that all of the incentives 
were held in stock, for which $100 in stock = $100 in incentives).  These very large wealth 
differences seem less plausible than an assumption of more similar wealth levels between the 
two countries, with the observed incentive differences caused by US CEOs holding a greater 
portion of their wealth in the firm.  For example, suppose that US CEOs had twice the wealth of 
their UK counterparts. Then if in 1997 the median US CEO held 50% of his wealth in the firm 
while the median UK CEO only held 16%, this would explain the observed incentive differences 
in 1997. Note that if it is the case that US CEOs hold more wealth in the firm, our risk premium 
estimates for UK CEOs will be upwardly biased, suggesting greater risk-adjusted pay for UK 
CEOs than our Table 6 and 7 estimates. 
 26
 A final objection to our analysis might be as follows: Does not the apparently much 
greater wealth of US CEOs constitute prima facie evidence that they are overpaid?  If US CEOs 
are not overpaid relative to UK CEOs, how do they have so much more wealth? Although an 
investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we note a few potential explanations 
for why US CEOs might be wealthier than UK CEOs. First, CEOs accumulate wealth through 
both risk-adjusted pay and through pay for risk. To the extent that US CEOs bear more incentive 
risk throughout their careers, they will be paid more and accumulate greater wealth (albeit with 
greater variance), all else being equal.  Second, compared to UK executives, US executive 
income is likely taxed at lower average rates over the individual’s career. Although the top 
marginal tax rate is similar across the US and UK, the top marginal tax rate is applicable at lower 
income levels in the UK than in the US. The top UK income tax rate of 40% affects incomes 
above approximately $58,000, whereas the top US income tax rate of 39% affects incomes above 
approximately $300,000.  Thus, future executives in the UK pay greater taxes earlier in their 
careers and are expected to accumulate less wealth. Further, capital gains of US executives are 
likely taxed at lower average rates. The capital gains tax rate on gains from equity sales is the 
same as the income tax rate in the UK. In the US, the top capital gains tax rate has generally been 
lower than the top marginal tax rate. In comparison to low US capital gains tax rates of 20% or 
below throughout our sample period, the UK capital gains rate has been 40%. Finally, we note 
that retirement ages are not mandatory in the UK. The normal retirement age in the UK is 65, 
which is similar to the US. Overall, it seems conceivable that US executives are wealthier 
because they receive higher risk premiums throughout their careers and are taxed at lower 
income and capital gains rates.  
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 An alternative argument for why US CEOs appear to accumulate more wealth is that US 
CEOs are systematically overpaid relative to UK CEOs due to systemic corporate governance 
weaknesses at US firms relative to UK firms. However, while it is obvious how excess pay leads 
to greater wealth, it is more difficult to see how this leads to greater incentives. In particular, why 
would a CEO who has considerable influence over the magnitude of his excess pay choose to 
bear excessive risk in the form of firm equity? The majority of stock and options held by US 
CEOs is vested and saleable, and it is difficult to see why CEOs with sufficient clout to ensure 
excessive pay would not also have the flexibility to liquidate their vested stock and option 
holdings for the purposes of holding a better-diversified portfolio of assets.  
 
5. Analysis of US vs. other European CEO pay and incentives 
 In this section, we analyze CEO pay and incentives at other non-UK European firms (EU 
firms). Although we believe this analysis provides some interesting additional insights on the 
potential importance of the risk premium in US vs. EU CEO pay, we recognize that this 
comparison gives rise to a substantially longer list of caveats and concerns. Specifically, unlike 
the US-UK comparisons, there are significant differences in corporate governance systems and 
practices between continental EU firms and the US (e.g., Becht, et al., 2002). For example, as 
compared to the US-UK, EU, capital markets tend to be smaller and less liquid, and there is a 
significantly weaker market for corporate control (e.g., takeovers are relatively infrequent). 
Ownership of EU firms tends to be more concentrated, and dominant family shareholdings are 
more prevalent, as in the case of France.  Further, bank finance and monitoring is especially 
important in some countries, such as Germany. Two-tier boards, where the management and 
supervisory boards are separate entities, are common (e.g., in Germany, Holland, and France). 
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Moreover, the governance of continental EU firms often reflects a wider implicit social contract 
(e.g., in Germany, co-determination rules require half of the supervisory board members to 
represent labor). At the same time, because executive compensation disclosures tend to be of less 
uniform quality in many European countries, our EU sample (which consists of companies 
providing sufficiently transparent disclosure to compute our pay and incentives variables) may 
be more heavily populated by firms with good corporate governance. Because of these 
differences, we are limited in our ability to draw inferences about potential reasons for any 
observed differences in risk-adjusted pay levels between the EU and the US. 
 We hand-collect CEO compensation and equity incentives data from annual reports and 
firm accounts for a sample of 40 EU firms for 2003.  We select companies from the main 
European exchanges where complete CEO compensation and option information is available. 
The small number of firms in the EU sample stems largely from limited disclosure of executive 
compensation in continental EU compared to the US, especially stock-options and other forms of 
equity compensation. Because of this, our sample over-represents firms with good disclosures 
about executive compensation. If firms with better disclosure have superior governance 
attributes, pay may be relatively lower, and incentives may be relatively higher, compared to 
non-disclosure firms. Also, because larger firms tend to have more detailed disclosures, our EU 
sample is comprised of very large firms, considerably larger than the typical firm in our US 
sample. Our results should be interpreted with the aforementioned caveats in mind. To allow for 
better comparisons to the US, we use the size and industry propensity-score-matching procedure 
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(described above in Tables 2 and 3) to select a sample of 40 US firms that we use to conduct our 
US vs. EU comparisons.18   
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 10. Since our propensity score model includes 
revenues, the firms in the US and EU samples have relatively similar revenues. US firms have 
somewhat larger market capitalizations (our propensity score model does not include market 
capitalization). The US CEOs have higher total pay than the EU CEOs ($5,075,000 vs. 
$3,284,000, respectively at the median). At the same time, the US CEOs also hold substantially 
greater equity incentives than the EU CEOs. The median US CEOs held stock equivalent value 
of $25.5 million as compared to $3.2 million in stock equivalent value for the EU CEOs.  
In Tables 11 and 12, we provide US-EU risk-adjusted pay analyses analogous to those in 
Tables 6 and 7. As in Table 6, controlling for the risk premium substantially reduces the pay 
differences between US CEOs and EU CEOs.  In 2003, the median US CEO received 55% more 
pay than the median EU CEO and held about 693% more equity incentives. Table 11 shows that 
after deducting our estimate of the expected compensation for holding the median level of 
incentives, the median risk-adjusted pay is 16% greater for US CEOs than EU CEOS 
($3,597,000 vs. $3,098,000). Or, alternatively stated, the $499,000 difference in median risk-
adjusted pay is substantially less than the $1,791,000 difference in observed median total pay.  
In Table 12, we examine risk-adjusted pay differences when the risk premium adjustment 
is applied on a CEO by CEO basis. In Panel A, we present the computed risk premium as a 
percentage of incentives. The lower risk premium for the median US CEO as compared to the 
median EU CEO (4.88% to 7.17%) stems from the fact that our EU sample firms generally have 
higher stock-return volatility than the matched US sample firms. Panel B of Table 12 shows that 
                         
18 Our propensity-score regression model indicates that, in addition to size, our EU firms have greater book-to-
market ratios, lower recent stock returns, lower firm risk, shorter CEO tenure, are less likely to combine the posts of 
CEO and chair, and have greater debt ratios. 
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the median risk-adjusted pay in 2003 is $3,605,000 for the US propensity-score-matched CEOs 
as compared to $2,682,000 for the EU CEOs. The median paired difference is not significantly 
different from 0. Abstracting away from the magnitude, 21 of 40 (52.25%) of US CEOs had 
greater risk-adjusted pay. Thus, as with the US-UK analysis, the results in Tables 11 and 12 
suggest that the observed pay difference between the US and EU CEOs may be explained by the 
large differences in risky equity incentives borne by these individuals.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
A growing body of academic research argues that problems with US governance and 
CEO pay are systemic and that overpayment of CEOs is not limited to a few bad apples, but that 
all CEOs in the US economy are overpaid. If this conjecture is correct, benchmarking within the 
US tells us little about whether US executive compensation practices, as a whole, suffer from 
systemic poor governance and excessive pay. Instead it is necessary to compare US practices 
with those of other countries where compensation practices ex ante are expected to suffer from 
these problems to a lesser extent. In this paper, we use the United Kingdom as a benchmark 
against which to examine whether CEO pay in the United States appears unusually high. These 
two economies share important governance features, but the UK is generally considered to be 
less afflicted by problems of excessive executive compensation.   
Using US and UK data for 1997 and 2003, we compare US and UK CEO annual pay and 
incentives. Pay is total annual pay (from cash, stock and option grants, and other pay) and 
incentives are measured in equivalent stock value (from holdings of stock and stock options). 
Controlling for firm characteristics, we find that US CEOs have higher compensation and much 
higher incentives than UK CEOs. In 2003, median pay for a matched sample of US CEOs was 
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23% higher than UK CEO pay and about 118% higher in 1997. At the same time, US CEO 
incentives in 2003 were about 4.8 times higher than UK CEO incentives and 6.3 times higher in 
1997.  
When firms impose greater equity incentives on executives, one expects to observe 
greater risk premiums paid to those executives.  Consequently, we expect that a portion of US 
CEOs’ relatively greater pay is due to their relatively greater equity incentives.  The key research 
question in our paper is whether greater risk premiums can explain some or all of the difference 
in pay between US and UK CEOs. To estimate risk premiums for US and UK CEOs, we extend 
the methods in Cai and Vijh (2005) under various assumptions about CEO risk-aversion and 
outside wealth. Viewing total CEO pay as the sum of pay for CEO effort/ability plus the risk 
premium to compensate the CEO for bearing incentive risk, we estimate risk-adjusted pay as 
total pay less the estimated risk premium CEOs receive for holding equity incentives. 
For a reasonable range of parameters typical in prior literature, we find that the difference 
in risk premiums plausibly accounts for differences in pay between US and UK CEOs. 
Specifically, we find that risk-adjusted pay for US CEOs is not consistently higher than that for 
UK CEOs (US CEOs have higher risk-adjusted pay in 1997, but UK CEOs have higher risk-
adjusted pay in 2003).  Our analysis of EU CEOs in 2003 offers a similar conclusion that US 
CEOs, while they have significantly higher pay, do not have significantly higher risk-adjusted 
pay than their EU counterparts.  
We note, however, that while risk premiums offer a potential economic explanation for 
why US pay is higher than UK and EU pay, it leaves open the question of why US incentives are 
so much larger than UK and EU incentives. We discuss differences in wealth accumulation as a 
potential reason for these differences, and suggest that researchers should shift their efforts 
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toward better understanding the reasons for differences in incentives between US and CEOs in 
the UK and in other parts of the world. 
We conclude that critics of high US executive pay should give greater consideration to 
the incentives borne by US CEOs and the risk premiums that executives are likely to require to 
bear these incentives.  Or stated another way, if critics believe that the level of US CEO pay is 
too high, they also might consider whether they would accept lower UK-style incentives as a 
trade-off for reductions in pay. However, some of these same critics call for greater “pay-for-
performance” and incentives for US CEOs.  Our findings suggest that calls for lower pay and 
greater pay-for-performance may be at odds with each other and may be economically infeasible. 
An important caveat is that our conclusions rely on the reasonableness of our risk 
premium estimates, and if our assumptions about risk-aversion and CEO lack of diversification 
are invalid, so are our risk premium estimates.  For example, if CEOs in both countries had much 
lower risk-aversion than is assumed in the literature, the estimated risk premium would decrease, 
and US pay would again appear high compared to UK pay. However, for a fairly broad range of 
assumptions, risk premiums are likely to remain an important consideration in understanding 
differences in pay across groups of CEOs with differing levels incentives. At the same time, 
quantifying the risk-aversion and wealth levels of top executives remains a crucial topic for 
future research in incentives and governance.  A second important caveat is that our conclusions 
rely on the appropriateness of the choice of the UK and the EU as a benchmark. If UK and EU 
CEOs are also overpaid, a finding that US CEOs are not more overpaid may be of little comfort. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics on full US and UK samples: CEO total pay, incentives, sales and 
market value in 1997 and 2003 
  Year Average Median Change 
in the 
average 
Change 
in the 
median 
Panel A:     
Salest-1  US 1997 $3,522 $975b     
($million) US 2003 $4,651 $1,121b 32.1% 15.0% 
     
 UK 1997 $4,295 $1,779   
 UK 2003 $5,155 $1,555 20.0% -12.6% 
     
Ratio US / UK  1997 0.82 0.55   
  2003 0.90 0.72   
Panel B:     
Market Value of  US 1997 $4,273 $1,072b   
Equityt-1 ($million) US 2003 $5,791 $1,168b 35.5% 9.0% 
     
 UK 1997 $4,985 $2,108   
 UK 2003 $4,996 $1,453 0.2% -31.1% 
     
Ratio US / UK  1997 0.86 0.51   
  2003 1.16 0.80   
Panel C:     
Total payt  US 1997 $3,739a $1,959a   
($thousands) US 2003 $4,439a $2,521a 18.7% 28.7%
       
 UK 1997 $1,295 $985   
 UK 2003 $2,583 $1,891 99.4% 92.0%
       
Ratio US / UK  1997 2.89 1.99   
  2003 1.72 1.33   
Panel D:     
CEO equity  US 1997 $88,800 $15,807a     
incentivest-1  US 2003 $120,444 $19,555a 35.6% 23.7%
($thousands)       
 UK 1997 $7,238 $2,409   
 UK 2003 $22,051 $3,806 204.7% 58.0%
       
Ratio US / UK  1997 12.27 6.56   
  2003 5.46 5.14   
 
a US value is significantly greater than UK value at a 5% level.  
b US value is significantly less than UK value at a 5% level.  
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Note: 
The US (UK) sample is 1372 (177) firms in 1997 and 1511 (214) firms in 2003. Sales and Market Value of Equity 
are measured at the beginning of the respective year. Total Pay for the firm’s CEO is defined as the sum of salaries, 
bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on the date of the grant using the Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock 
grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards), and other compensation. CEO equity incentives are in 
equivalent stock value, and are defined as: (share price) × (the number of shares held) + (share price) × (option 
delta) × (the number of options held). UK pounds sterling denominated data are converted to US dollars using the 
average $/£ exchange rate during 1997 (=1.6386) and 2003 (=1.6355).   
 
Table 2 
Determinants of US and UK CEO pay and incentives, and Propensity-Score Matching regression 
 
 Dependent Variable: OLS Regressions 
 Log CEO Payt Log CEO Incentivest-1 
Logit Regression (UK = 1) for 
Propensity-Score Matching 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Year: 1997 Year: 2003 Year: 1997  Year 2003 Year: 1997  Year 2003 
       
US indicator 0.65** 0.25** 1.92** 1.72**   
 (9.18) (3.96) (12.31) (12.11)   
Log(salest-1) 0.40** 0.40** 0.37** 0.42** -0.02 0.24** 
 (17.85) (21.17) (11.42) (15.49) (0.06) (10.27) 
Book to markett-1 -0.88** -0.64** -2.59** -1.77** -0.69 1.55** 
 (-7.90) (-6.03) (-14.48) (-14.08) (1.20) (14.58) 
Log(Idio. Risk)t-1 0.30** 0.18** 0.26** -0.38** -1.07** -0.52* 
 (5.22) (3.25) (2.07) (-4.21) (8.11) (4.11) 
Log(Tenure )t-1 0.20** -0.09 0.49** 0.61** 0.33** 0.65** 
 (2.96) (-1.20) (11.80) (14.96) (8.25) (38.57) 
CEO-Chair Indicatort-1 0.01 0.03 0.35** 0.22** -3.11** -4.70** 
 (0.20) (1.38) (4.24) (3.26) (133.92) (136.48) 
Leveraget-1 0.08 0.11** -0.07** -0.02** 0.03 0.04 
 (1.56) (2.21) (-4.45) (-4.96) (0.61) (2.75) 
Shareholder returnt 0.30** 0.18**   -4.51** -1.33** 
 (5.22) (3.25)   (115.62) (20.25) 
       
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1549 1,725 1549 1,725 1449 1629 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.40 0.55 0.58   
       
US-UK difference 91.6% 28.4% 582.1% 464.1%   
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Note: 
A * is significant at 5%, and ** is significant at 1%.  T-statistics are given in parentheses for Columns (1)-(4), and are based on Huber-White robust standard 
errors. Chi-Square statistics are given in parentheses in Columns (5)-(6).  Total Pay for the firm’s CEO is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock 
options (valued on the date of the grant using the Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards) and other 
compensation. CEO equity incentives are in equivalent stock value, and are defined as: (share price) × (the number of shares held) + (share price) × (option delta) 
× (the number of options held). Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of assets to the sum of book value of liabilities plus market value of equity. 
Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model estimated daily over year t-1.. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has held 
that position. CEO-Chair Indicator takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also board chair, and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of book value of liabilities to 
market value of assets. Shareholder Return is the one-year total return to shareholders. Industry dummy variables are computed at the two-digit SIC code level. 
UK pounds sterling denominated data are converted to US dollars using the average $/£ exchange rate during 1997 (=1.6386) and 2003 (=1.6355).  The US-UK 
CEO difference is calculated from the US indicator variable as 100×(ecoefficient estimate – 1). The 1997 to 2003 change is calculated from the Year=2003 variable as 
100×(ecoefficient estimate – 1). The logit regressions in Columns (5)-(6) model the probability that a firm is a UK firm as a function of sales, book-to-market, tenure, 
CEO-Chair indicator, leverage and shareholder return. In the logit regressions, we include only US observations for which we have a UK observation in same 
industry (because our propensity-score matching procedure matches within industry). 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics on propensity-score-matched US and UK samples: CEO total pay, 
incentives, sales and market value in 1997 and 2003 
 
  Year Average Median Change in the 
average 
Change in the 
median 
Panel A:     
Salest-1  US 1997 $4,641 $1,578   
($million) US 2003 $5,197 $1,528 12.0% -3.1% 
     
 UK 1997 $4,295 $1,779   
 UK 2003 $5,155 $1,555 20.0% -12.6% 
     
Ratio US / UK  1997 1.02 0.98   
  2003 0.92 1.08   
Panel B:     
Market Value of  US 1997 $5,066 $1,926   
Equityt-1 ($million) US 2003 $7,486 $1,529 47.8% -20.6% 
     
 UK 1997 $4,985 $2,108   
 UK 2003 $4,996 $1,453 0.2% -31.1% 
     
Ratio US / UK  1997 1.02 0.91   
  2003 1.50 1.05   
Panel C:     
Total payt  US 1997 $3,890a $2,148a   
($thousands) US 2003 $4,680a $2,333a 20.3% 8.6% 
       
 UK 1997 $1,295 $985   
 UK 2003 $2,583 $1,891 99.4% 92.0% 
       
Ratio US / UK  1997 3.00 2.18   
  2003 1.81 1.23   
Panel D:     
CEO equity  US 1997 $73,755a $15,192a   
incentivest-1  US 2003 $244,115a $18,393a 231.0% 21.1%
($thousands)       
 UK 1997 $7,238 $2,409   
 UK 2003 $22,051 $3,806 204.7% 58.0%
       
Ratio US / UK  1997 10.19 6.31   
  2003 11.07 4.83   
a US value is significantly greater than UK value at a 5% level.  
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Note: 
The UK sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 214 firms in 2003. The US sample also consists of 177 firms in 1997 
and 214 firms in 2003, selected using propensity scores developed from the logit regressions reported in Columns (5)-
(6) of Table 2. Each UK firm is matched within industry to the US firm with the closest propensity score.   
   Sales and Market Value of Equity are measured at the beginning of the respective year. Total Pay for the firm’s CEO 
is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on the date of the grant using the Black-
Scholes formula), restricted stock grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards), and other compensation. 
CEO equity incentives are in equivalent stock value, and are defined as: (share price) × (the number of shares held) + 
(share price) × (option delta) × (the number of options held). UK pounds sterling denominated data are converted to US 
dollars using the average $/£ exchange rate during 1997 (=1.6386) and 2003 (=1.6355). 
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Table 4 
Illustration of incremental pay for incremental incentives for the median CEO 
 
 
  
Median Pay and Incentives ($thousands) 
 
 
US UK 
Difference: 
US – UK 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
1997    
    
CEO Pay in 1997 $2,148  $985  $1,163  
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 1997 $15,192  $2,409  $12,783  
    
Incremental pay per unit of incremental incentive (%)   9.10% 
    
    
2003    
    
CEO Pay in 2003  $2,333  $1,891   $442  
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 2003  $18,393  $3,806   $14,587  
    
Incremental pay per unit of incremental incentive (%)   3.03% 
    
 
Note: 
Incremental pay per unit of incremental incentive in the last column is computed as the difference in pay divided by the 
difference in incentives, and is expressed as a percentage. 
 
The UK sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 214 firms in 2003. The US sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 
214 firms in 2003, selected using the propensity-score-matching procedure described in Tables 2 and 3. CEO pay is 
defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on the date of the grant using the Black-Scholes 
formula), restricted stock grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards) and other compensation.  
Incentives are the dollar change in CEO firm-specific wealth from a one percent change in the stock price, and are 
measured at the beginning of the year. UK pounds sterling denominated data are converted to US dollars using the 
average $/£ exchange rate during each of the years 1997 (=1.6386) and 2003 (=1.6355).  
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Table 5 
Risk premium for holding firm equity  
 
     % of wealth in firm equity 
Relative risk-aversion 50% 67% 
 
2 5.8% 7.6% 
 
3 8.5% 11.0% 
   
 
 
 
 
Note: 
This table shows the risk premium as a % of incentives for various levels of risk-aversion and % of wealth in firm stock. 
The risk premium is derived by solving: 
 
)]  ,   ,   ([                
)] ([
premiumriskwealthoutsideuityto firm eqdconstrainewealthUE
nedunconstraiwealthUE =
  (1) 
The expression on the left side is the utility the executive receives from investing his wealth in a utility-maximizing 
combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. The expression on the right side is the utility the executive 
receives when he is constrained to invest some proportion of his starting wealth in firm equity, and the remainder in a 
utility-maximizing combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio. The executive holds the positions for one 
year. The risk premium is assumed to be paid at the end of the year, and is the amount that sets the two sides equal. A 
percentage risk premium of 5.8%, for example, means that, if the CEO had $1 million in firm equity, he would need to 
receive $58,000 in extra pay to compensate for the additional risk. 
 
The executive is assumed to hold all stock (no options). Returns on the stock and on the market portfolio are assumed to 
be jointly lognormal, and to follow the capital asset pricing model. The market is assumed to have an 11% expected 
return and 20% volatility, and the risk-free rate is assumed to be 5%. The stock is assumed to have a beta of 1, an 11% 
expected return, and 40% volatility. 
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Table 6 
Implied risk-adjusted pay for the median CEO 
  
Median Pay and Incentives ($thousands) 
 
 US UK US/UK 
    
Relative risk-aversion 2 2 1.00 
Wealth in firm (%) 50% 50% 1.00 
    
1997    
    
CEO Pay in 1997 $2,148  $985  2.18 
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 1997 $15,192  $2,409  6.31 
Implied CEO Total Wealth $30,384  $4,818  6.31 
    
Risk premium (5.8% of incentives)  $881  $140  6.31 
    
Implied risk-adjusted pay $1,267  $845  1.50 
    
    
2003    
    
CEO Pay in 2003 $2,333  $1,891  1.23 
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 2003 $18,393  $3,806  4.83 
Implied CEO Total Wealth $36,787  $7,612  4.83 
    
Risk premium (5.8% of incentives)  $1,067  $221  4.83 
    
Implied risk-adjusted pay $1,266  $1,670  0.76 
    
 
Note: 
Implied risk-adjusted pay is computed as pay minus the risk premium.  The risk premium is assumed to be 5.8% of 
incentive (assuming relative risk-aversion of 2.0 and 50% of wealth in firm equity, and using the calculations shown in 
Table 5). Implied CEO total wealth, under the assumption of 50% of wealth in firm equity, and the simplifying 
assumption that all incentives come from stock, is (equity incentives)/.50. 
 
The UK sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 214 firms in 2003. The UK sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 
214 firms in 2003. The US sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 214 firms in 2003, selected using the propensity-
score-matching procedure described in Tables 2 and 3.  CEO pay is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, 
stock options (valued on the date of the grant using the Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock grants (valued at 100% 
of performance contingent awards) and other compensation.  CEO equity incentives are in equivalent stock value, and 
are defined as: (share price) × (the number of shares held) + (share price) × (option delta) × (the number of options 
held), measured at the beginning of the year. UK pounds sterling denominated data are converted to US dollars using 
the average $/£ exchange rate during 1997 (=1.6386) and 2003 (=1.6355).  
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Table 7 
Implied CEO-specific risk-adjusted pay 
 
Panel A: Computed risk premium as % of incentives 
 
  
Country 
 
N 
 
Average 
 
 
25th 
percentile 
 
Median 
 
75th 
percentile 
       
1997 UK 177 4.01% 2.69% 3.86% 5.05% 
 US 177 4.11% 2.53% 3.68% 5.13% 
       
2003 UK 214 8.37% 5.05% 7.21% 8.98% 
 US 214 8.78 % 4.84 % 6.59 % 10.52%  
 
Panel B: Implied risk-adjusted pay ($thousands) 
 
 
  
Country 
 
N 
Average 
(All values) 
Average 
(Negative 
Values set to 
0) 
 
25th 
percentile
 
Median 
 
75th 
percentile
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
        
1997 UK 177 $1,008 $1,087 $481 $808 $1,334 
 US 177 $1,406  $2,595   $458  $1,316  $2,991  
 US-UK 177 $398 -- -$759 $540a $2,211 
 %(US>UK)  58.2%     
        
2003 UK 214 $936 $2,086 $905 $1,564 $2,728 
 US 214 -$11,561 $2,651 $16  $885 $2,528  
 US-UK 214 -$12,497 -- -$2,443 -$695b $1,331 
 %(US>UK)  39.3%     
 
a US value is significantly greater than UK value at a 5% level.  
b US value is significantly lower than UK value at a 5% level.  
 
Note: 
The UK sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 214 firms in 2003. The US sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 
214 firms in 2003, selected using the propensity-score-matching procedure described in Tables 2 and 3. Implied risk-
adjusted pay (expressed in thousands of dollars) is computed as total pay minus the risk premium.  The risk premium is 
estimated using Equation (1) above assuming that the CEO has relative risk-aversion of 2 and 50% of his wealth outside 
the firm. Inputs into the calculation are the CEO’s beginning-of-year stock and option portfolio, the firm’s beta and 
volatility, an assumed market volatility of 20%, a risk-free rate of 5%, and a market risk premium of 6%. UK pounds 
sterling denominated data are converted to US dollars using the average $/£ exchange rate during 1997 (=1.6386) and 
2003 (=1.6355).  
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Table 8 
Differences in UK-US CEO pay and incentives: Relations to Competition and Globalization  
 
 Median Regressions: Dependent Variable (000’s) 
 US-UK Diff in CEO Payt 
US-UK Diff in 
CEO Incentivest-1 
US-UK Diff in CEO 
Risk-Adjusted Payt 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
    
Intercept 1.06** 9.74** 0.49* 
 (3.40) (3.83) (1.95) 
 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 2.51 23.73 3.47 
 (0.44) (0.40) (0.71) 
UK Foreign Exchange 
Listing Indicator -1.42* 11.44* -1.06 
 (-2.12) (1.79) (-1.44) 
    
Year 2003 Indicator -0.82* -0.27 -1.25** 
 (-2.57) (-0.09) (-4.14) 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
Note: 
A * is significant at 5%, and ** is significant at 1%.  The UK sample consists of 391 firm-years (177 firm-years in 1997 
and 214 firm-years in 2003). The US sample also consists of 391 firm-years, selected using propensity scores developed 
from the logit regressions reported in Columns (5)-(6) of Table 2. Each UK firm is matched within industry to the US 
firm with the closest propensity score.   
UK Foreign Exchange Listing Indicator is an indicator variable for whether the UK firm was listed on any US 
exchange, as a proxy for the degree of exposure the UK firm has to global markets. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is 
the sum of squared market shares within a 2-digit SIC industry. The market share is firm sales as a fraction of total 
industry sales. 
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Table 9 
Implied risk-adjusted pay for the median CEO – Sensitivity analysis  
UK CEOs assumed more risk-averse and less diversified than US CEOs 
 Median Pay and Incentives ($thousands) 
 US UK US/UK 
    
Relative risk-aversion 2 3 0.67 
Wealth in firm (%) 50% 67% 0.67 
    
1997    
    
CEO Pay in 1997 $2,148  $985  2.18 
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 1997 $15,192  $2,409  6.31 
Implied CEO Total Wealth $30,384  $3,596  8.45 
    
Risk premium (5.8% for US and 11.0% for UK)  $881  $265  3.33 
    
Implied risk-adjusted pay $1,267  $720  1.76 
    
2003    
    
CEO Pay in 2003 $2,333  $1,891  1.23 
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 2003 $18,393  $3,806  4.83 
Implied CEO Total Wealth $36,787  $5,681  6.48 
    
Risk premium (5.8% for US and 11.0% for UK) $1,067 $419  2.55 
    
Implied risk-adjusted pay $1,266 $1,472  0.86 
    
Note: 
The UK sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 214 firms in 2003. The US sample consists of 177 firms in 1997 and 
214 firms in 2003, selected using the propensity-score-matching procedure described in Tables 2 and 3. Implied risk-
adjusted pay is computed as pay minus the risk premium.  The risk premium is assumed to be 5.8% of incentives for US 
CEOs (assuming relative risk-aversion of 2.0 and 50% of wealth in firm equity and using the calculations shown in 
Table 5), and is assumed to be 11.0% of incentives for the UK CEOs (assuming relative risk-aversion of 3.0 and 67% of 
wealth in firm equity and using the calculations shown in Table 5). Implied CEO total wealth for US CEOs, under the 
assumption of 50% of wealth in firm equity, and the simplifying assumption that all incentives come from stock, is 
(equity incentives)/.50, and for UK CEOs, under the assumption of 67% of wealth in firm equity, and the simplifying 
assumption that all incentives come from stock, is (equity incentives)/.67. 
 
CEO pay is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on the date of the grant using the 
Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards) and other 
compensation.  CEO equity incentives are in equivalent stock value, and are defined as: (share price) × (the number of 
shares held) + (share price) × (option delta) × (the number of options held), measured at the beginning of the year.  UK 
pounds sterling denominated data are converted to US dollars using the average $/£ exchange rate during 1997 
(=1.6386) and 2003 (=1.6355). 
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Table 10 
Descriptive statistics EU sample and propensity-score-matched US sample:  
CEO total pay, incentives, sales and market value in 2003 
 
  Average Median 
Panel A:    
    
Salest-1 ($million) US $20,909  $17,611  
 EU $24,979  $18,590  
    
Ratio US / EU  0.84 0.95 
    
Panel B:    
    
Market Value of US $28,934  $14,151  
Equityt-1($million) EU $18,512  $12,163  
    
Ratio US / EU  1.56 1.16 
    
Panel C:    
    
Total payt ($thousands) US $8,038a  $5,075a  
 EU $4,982  $3,284  
    
Ratio US / EU  1.61 1.55 
    
Panel D:    
    
CEO equity incentivest-1 US $375,937a $25,478a  
($thousands) EU $5,858  $3,213  
    
Ratio US / EU  64.17 7.93 
    
    
 
a US value is significantly greater than EU value at a 5% level.  
Note: 
The EU sample consists of 40 firms in 2003. The US sample also consists of 40 firms in 2003, selected using propensity 
scores developed from a logit regression similar to those reported in Columns (5)-(6) of Table 2. Each EU firm is 
matched within industry to the US firm with the closest propensity score.  Sales and Market Value of Equity are 
measured at the beginning of the respective year. Total Pay for the firm’s CEO is defined as the sum of salaries, 
bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on the date of the grant using the Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock 
grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards), and other compensation. CEO equity incentives are in 
equivalent stock value, and are defined as: (share price) × (the number of shares held) + (share price) × (option delta) × 
(the number of options held). EU currency denominated data are converted to US dollars using the average exchange 
rate during 2003. 
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Table 11 
EU and US Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
Panel A Incremental pay for incremental incentive for the median CEO 
 
  
Median Pay and Incentives ($thousands) 
 
 
US EU 
Difference: 
US – EU 
    
CEO Pay in 2003 $5,075  $3,284  $1,791  
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 2003 $25,478  $3,213  $22,265  
    
Incremental pay per unit of incremental incentive   8.04% 
    
 
Panel B Implied risk-adjusted pay for the median CEO 
 
  
Median Pay and Incentives ($thousands) 
 
 US EU US/EU 
    
CEO Pay in 2003 $5,075  $3,284  1.55 
    
CEO Equity Incentives at beginning of 2003 $25,478  $3,213  7.93 
Implied CEO Total Wealth $50,955  $6,425  7.93 
    
Risk premium (5.8% of incentives)  $1,478  $186  7.93 
    
Implied risk-adjusted pay $3,597  $3,098  1.16 
    
 
Note: 
Implied risk-adjusted pay is computed as pay minus the risk premium.  The risk premium is assumed to be 5.8% of 
incentive (assuming relative risk-aversion of 2.0 and 50% of wealth in firm equity, and using the calculations shown in 
Table 5). Implied CEO total wealth, under the assumption of 50% of wealth in firm equity, and the simplifying 
assumption that all incentives come from stock, is (equity incentives)/.50. 
 
Total Pay for the firm’s CEO is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on the date of 
the grant using the Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock grants (valued at 100% of performance contingent awards), 
and other compensation. CEO equity incentives are in equivalent stock value, and are defined as: (share price) × (the 
number of shares held) + (share price) × (option delta) × (the number of options held). EU currency denominated data 
are converted to US dollars using the average exchange rate during 2003. 
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Table 12 
Implied CEO-specific risk-adjusted pay 
EU and US Propensity Score-Matched Sample 
 
Panel A: Computed risk premium as % of incentives 
 
  
Country 
 
N 
 
Average 
 
 
25th 
percentile 
 
Median 
 
75th 
percentile 
       
2003 US 40 8.22 3.65 4.88 9.17 
 EU 40 7.87 4.44 7.17 9.48 
 
Panel B: Implied risk-adjusted pay ($thousands) 
 
 
  
Country 
 
N 
Average 
(All 
values) 
Average 
(Negative 
Values 
set to 0) 
 
25th 
percentile 
 
Median 
 
75th 
percentile 
        
2003 US 40 -10,654 5,354 903 3,605 8,557 
 EU 40 5,354 4,532 2,037 2,682 4,717 
 US-EU 40 -$15,175  -$3,218 $1,061 $5,309 
 %(US>EU)  52.5%     
 
Note: 
The EU sample consists of 40 firms in 2003. The US sample consists of 40 firms in 2003, selected using propensity 
scores developed from logit regressions similar to those reported in Columns (5)-(6) of Table 2. Each EU firm is 
matched within industry to the US firm with the closest propensity score. Implied risk-adjusted pay (expressed in 
thousands of dollars) is computed as total pay minus the risk premium.  The risk premium is estimated using Equation 
(1) above assuming that the CEO has relative risk-aversion of 2 and 50% of his wealth outside the firm. Inputs into the 
calculation are the CEO’s beginning-of-year stock and option portfolio, the firm’s beta and volatility, an assumed 
market volatility of 20%, a risk-free rate of 5%, and a market risk premium of 6%. EU currency denominated data are 
converted to US dollars using the average exchange rate during 2003. 
 
